Packing Returning Secretaries

We study online secretary problems with returns in combinatorial packing domains with $n$ candidates that arrive sequentially over time in random order. The goal is to accept a feasible packing of candidates of maximum total value. In the first variant, each candidate arrives exactly twice. All $2n$ arrivals occur in random order. We propose a simple 0.5-competitive algorithm that can be combined with arbitrary approximation algorithms for the packing domain, even when the total value of candidates is a subadditive function. For bipartite matching, we obtain an algorithm with competitive ratio at least $0.5721 - o(1)$ for growing $n$, and an algorithm with ratio at least $0.5459$ for all $n \ge 1$. We extend all algorithms and ratios to $k \ge 2$ arrivals per candidate. In the second variant, there is a pool of undecided candidates. In each round, a random candidate from the pool arrives. Upon arrival a candidate can be either decided (accept/reject) or postponed (returned into the pool). We mainly focus on minimizing the expected number of postponements when computing an optimal solution. An expected number of $\Theta(n \log n)$ is always sufficient. For matroids, we show that the expected number can be reduced to $O(r \log (n/r))$, where $r \le n/2$ is the minimum of the ranks of matroid and dual matroid. For bipartite matching, we show a bound of $O(r \log n)$, where $r$ is the size of the optimum matching. For general packing, we show a lower bound of $\Omega(n \log \log n)$, even when the size of the optimum is $r = \Theta(\log n)$.Comment: 23 pages, 5 figure

Single Parameter Combinatorial Auctions with Partially Public Valuations

We consider the problem of designing truthful auctions, when the bidders' valuations have a public and a private component. In particular, we consider combinatorial auctions where the valuation of an agent $i$ for a set $S$ of items can be expressed as $v_if(S)$, where $v_i$ is a private single parameter of the agent, and the function $f$ is publicly known. Our motivation behind studying this problem is two-fold: (a) Such valuation functions arise naturally in the case of ad-slots in broadcast media such as Television and Radio. For an ad shown in a set $S$ of ad-slots, $f(S)$ is, say, the number of {\em unique} viewers reached by the ad, and $v_i$ is the valuation per-unique-viewer. (b) From a theoretical point of view, this factorization of the valuation function simplifies the bidding language, and renders the combinatorial auction more amenable to better approximation factors. We present a general technique, based on maximal-in-range mechanisms, that converts any $\alpha$-approximation non-truthful algorithm ($\alpha \leq 1$) for this problem into $\Omega(\frac{\alpha}{\log{n}})$ and $\Omega(\alpha)$-approximate truthful mechanisms which run in polynomial time and quasi-polynomial time, respectively

Reading Articles Online

We study the online problem of reading articles that are listed in an aggregated form in a dynamic stream, e.g., in news feeds, as abbreviated social media posts, or in the daily update of new articles on arXiv. In such a context, the brief information on an article in the listing only hints at its content. We consider readers who want to maximize their information gain within a limited time budget, hence either discarding an article right away based on the hint or accessing it for reading. The reader can decide at any point whether to continue with the current article or skip the remaining part irrevocably. In this regard, Reading Articles Online, RAO, does differ substantially from the Online Knapsack Problem, but also has its similarities. Under mild assumptions, we show that any $\alpha$-competitive algorithm for the Online Knapsack Problem in the random order model can be used as a black box to obtain an $(\mathrm{e} + \alpha)C$-competitive algorithm for RAO, where $C$ measures the accuracy of the hints with respect to the information profiles of the articles. Specifically, with the current best algorithm for Online Knapsack, which is $6.65<2.45\mathrm{e}$-competitive, we obtain an upper bound of $3.45\mathrm{e} C$ on the competitive ratio of RAO. Furthermore, we study a natural algorithm that decides whether or not to read an article based on a single threshold value, which can serve as a model of human readers. We show that this algorithmic technique is $O(C)$-competitive. Hence, our algorithms are constant-competitive whenever the accuracy $C$ is a constant.Comment: Manuscript of COCOA 2020 pape

Online Independent Set Beyond the Worst-Case: Secretaries, Prophets, and Periods

We investigate online algorithms for maximum (weight) independent set on graph classes with bounded inductive independence number like, e.g., interval and disk graphs with applications to, e.g., task scheduling and spectrum allocation. In the online setting, it is assumed that nodes of an unknown graph arrive one by one over time. An online algorithm has to decide whether an arriving node should be included into the independent set. Unfortunately, this natural and practically relevant online problem cannot be studied in a meaningful way within a classical competitive analysis as the competitive ratio on worst-case input sequences is lower bounded by $\Omega(n)$. As a worst-case analysis is pointless, we study online independent set in a stochastic analysis. Instead of focussing on a particular stochastic input model, we present a generic sampling approach that enables us to devise online algorithms achieving performance guarantees for a variety of input models. In particular, our analysis covers stochastic input models like the secretary model, in which an adversarial graph is presented in random order, and the prophet-inequality model, in which a randomly generated graph is presented in adversarial order. Our sampling approach bridges thus between stochastic input models of quite different nature. In addition, we show that our approach can be applied to a practically motivated admission control setting. Our sampling approach yields an online algorithm for maximum independent set with competitive ratio $O(\rho^2)$ with respect to all of the mentioned stochastic input models. for graph classes with inductive independence number $\rho$. The approach can be extended towards maximum-weight independent set by losing only a factor of $O(\log n)$ in the competitive ratio with $n$ denoting the (expected) number of nodes

Buyback Problem - Approximate matroid intersection with cancellation costs

In the buyback problem, an algorithm observes a sequence of bids and must decide whether to accept each bid at the moment it arrives, subject to some constraints on the set of accepted bids. Decisions to reject bids are irrevocable, whereas decisions to accept bids may be canceled at a cost that is a fixed fraction of the bid value. Previous to our work, deterministic and randomized algorithms were known when the constraint is a matroid constraint. We extend this and give a deterministic algorithm for the case when the constraint is an intersection of $k$ matroid constraints. We further prove a matching lower bound on the competitive ratio for this problem and extend our results to arbitrary downward closed set systems. This problem has applications to banner advertisement, semi-streaming, routing, load balancing and other problems where preemption or cancellation of previous allocations is allowed

Solving Multi-choice Secretary Problem in Parallel: An Optimal Observation-Selection Protocol

The classical secretary problem investigates the question of how to hire the best secretary from $n$ candidates who come in a uniformly random order. In this work we investigate a parallel generalizations of this problem introduced by Feldman and Tennenholtz [14]. We call it shared $Q$-queue $J$-choice $K$-best secretary problem. In this problem, $n$ candidates are evenly distributed into $Q$ queues, and instead of hiring the best one, the employer wants to hire $J$ candidates among the best $K$ persons. The $J$ quotas are shared by all queues. This problem is a generalized version of $J$-choice $K$-best problem which has been extensively studied and it has more practical value as it characterizes the parallel situation. Although a few of works have been done about this generalization, to the best of our knowledge, no optimal deterministic protocol was known with general $Q$ queues. In this paper, we provide an optimal deterministic protocol for this problem. The protocol is in the same style of the $1\over e$-solution for the classical secretary problem, but with multiple phases and adaptive criteria. Our protocol is very simple and efficient, and we show that several generalizations, such as the fractional $J$-choice $K$-best secretary problem and exclusive $Q$-queue $J$-choice $K$-best secretary problem, can be solved optimally by this protocol with slight modification and the latter one solves an open problem of Feldman and Tennenholtz [14]. In addition, we provide theoretical analysis for two typical cases, including the 1-queue 1-choice $K$-best problem and the shared 2-queue 2-choice 2-best problem. For the former, we prove a lower bound $1-O(\frac{\ln^2K}{K^2})$ of the competitive ratio. For the latter, we show the optimal competitive ratio is $\approx0.372$ while previously the best known result is 0.356 [14].Comment: This work is accepted by ISAAC 201

Constrained Non-Monotone Submodular Maximization: Offline and Secretary Algorithms

Constrained submodular maximization problems have long been studied, with near-optimal results known under a variety of constraints when the submodular function is monotone. The case of non-monotone submodular maximization is less understood: the first approximation algorithms even for the unconstrainted setting were given by Feige et al. (FOCS '07). More recently, Lee et al. (STOC '09, APPROX '09) show how to approximately maximize non-monotone submodular functions when the constraints are given by the intersection of p matroid constraints; their algorithm is based on local-search procedures that consider p-swaps, and hence the running time may be n^Omega(p), implying their algorithm is polynomial-time only for constantly many matroids. In this paper, we give algorithms that work for p-independence systems (which generalize constraints given by the intersection of p matroids), where the running time is poly(n,p). Our algorithm essentially reduces the non-monotone maximization problem to multiple runs of the greedy algorithm previously used in the monotone case. Our idea of using existing algorithms for monotone functions to solve the non-monotone case also works for maximizing a submodular function with respect to a knapsack constraint: we get a simple greedy-based constant-factor approximation for this problem. With these simpler algorithms, we are able to adapt our approach to constrained non-monotone submodular maximization to the (online) secretary setting, where elements arrive one at a time in random order, and the algorithm must make irrevocable decisions about whether or not to select each element as it arrives. We give constant approximations in this secretary setting when the algorithm is constrained subject to a uniform matroid or a partition matroid, and give an O(log k) approximation when it is constrained by a general matroid of rank k.Comment: In the Proceedings of WINE 201

Secretary Problems: Weights and Discounts

The classical secretary problem studies the problem of selecting online an element (a “secretary”) with maximum value in a randomly ordered sequence. The difficulty lies in the fact that an element must be either selected or discarded upon its arrival, and this decision is irrevocable. Constant-competitive algorithms are known for the classical secretary problems and several variants. We study the following two extensions of the secretary problem: In the discounted secretary problem, there is a time-dependent “discount” factor $d(t)$, and the benefit derived from selecting an element/secretary e at time t is $d(t)v(e)$. For this problem with arbitrary (not necessarily decreasing) functions $d(t)$, we show a constant-competitive algorithm when the expected optimum is known in advance. With no prior knowledge, we exhibit a lower bound and give a nearly matching $O(log n)$-competitive algorithm. In the weighted secretary problem, up to K secretaries can be selected; when a secretary is selected (s)he must be irrevocably assigned to one of K positions, with position k having weight $w(k)$, and assigning object/secretary e to position k has benefit $w(k)v(e)$. The goal is to select secretaries and assign them to positions to maximize the sum of $w(k)v(e_k)$ where $e_k$ is the secretary assigned to position k. We give constant-competitive algorithms for this problem. Most of these results can also be extended to the matroid secretary case for a large family of matroids with a constant-factor loss, and an O(log rank) loss for general matroids. These results are based on a reduction from various matroids to partition matroids which present a unified approach to many of the upper bounds of Babaioff et al. These problems have connections to online mechanism design. All our algorithms are monotone, and hence lead to truthful mechanisms for the corresponding online auction problems

Pricing Multi-Unit Markets

We study the power and limitations of posted prices in multi-unit markets, where agents arrive sequentially in an arbitrary order. We prove upper and lower bounds on the largest fraction of the optimal social welfare that can be guaranteed with posted prices, under a range of assumptions about the designer's information and agents' valuations. Our results provide insights about the relative power of uniform and non-uniform prices, the relative difficulty of different valuation classes, and the implications of different informational assumptions. Among other results, we prove constant-factor guarantees for agents with (symmetric) subadditive valuations, even in an incomplete-information setting and with uniform prices